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Commercial Surrogacy: Building Families Outside
of Family Law
Sylvie Armstrong*

ABSTRACT
Assisted Reproductive Technology continues to grow in popularity.
Commercial surrogacy has proved no exception to this trend. However,
lack of regulation at the international, federal, and state levels has given
rise to a myriad of ethical and legal problems. This article considers the
taxonomical question that any regulator must ask: Which field of law ought
to be responsible for regulating this industry? It argues that although
commercial surrogacy is often discussed as part of the family law rubric,
on closer inspection, family law is fundamentally ill-suited to meet the
needs of those involved in commercial surrogacy. By demonstrating the
challenges with this regulatory paradigm, this article lays the groundwork
so that scholars of other areas of law might explore this issue.
Keywords: assisted reproductive technology, families, regulation,
commercial surrogacy, taxonomy
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I. INTRODUCTION
The commercial surrogacy industry is estimated to be worth about $2.3
billion worldwide.1 Although it is unknown how many children are born
each year through these arrangements, the amount spent on commercial
surrogacy every year is testament to the enormous growth in this form of
assisted reproductive technology since its inception in the mid-1980s,
which is estimated to have risen by 1,162% globally between 2009–2013.2
Despite this enormous growth in social use, however, legislative response
has been consistently slow and vastly inconsistent. There is a dearth of
international regulatory provisions,3 and a similar absence at the federal
level in the United States.4
At the state level, regulation is inconsistent. California, for example, is
one of only eleven states to statutorily recognize the intended parents
through a commercial surrogacy arrangement at the time of the child’s
birth.5 Throughout the rest of the United States, state law is a hodgepodge
of case law and partial statutes,6 ranging from full prohibition of
commercial surrogacy7 to recognition of commercial surrogacy contingent
on particular criteria being met. For example, some states disallow profit
from commercial surrogacy,8 require the intended parents to be married,9
or prohibit the surrogate from being genetically related to the child.10
This spectrum of permissiveness to prohibition of commercial
surrogacy is cross-continental.11 Yet, as will be shown, these national and
international inconsistencies have caused major ethical and legal dilemmas,

1. Jane Cottingham, Babies, Borders, and Big Business, 25 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS
17, 17 (2017).
2. Mahua Sarkar, When Maternity is Paid Work: Commercial Gestational Surrogacy at
the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, in WOMEN’S ILO: TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS,
GLOBAL LABOR STANDARDS AND GENDER EQUITY, 1919 TO PRESENT 340, 346 (Eileen Boris,
et al. eds., 2018).
3. Katarina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements: An
Urgent Need for Legal Regulation at the International Level, 7 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 627, 630
(2011).
4. The United States Surrogacy Law Map, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS,
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map (last visited Feb. 21,
2021).
5. See The United States Surrogacy Law Map, supra note 4 (for a comprehensive
overview of surrogacy laws in the U.S.).
6. Id.
7. See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §722.855 (1988).
8. See e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (2018).
9. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §742.15 (1993).
10. See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2005).
11. Jens M. Scherpe & Claire Fenton-Glynn, Introduction to EASTERN AND WESTERN
PERSPECTIVES ON SURROGACY 1, 4–5 (Jen M. Scherpe et al. eds., 2019).
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inspiring a number of leading academics in this field to call for
reconsideration of the current regulatory landscape.12
What a suitable regulatory framework for the commercial surrogacy
industry might be is currently an unanswered question. This article suggests
that, at least in part, the debate has stagnated due to the common assumption
that commercial surrogacy is a matter for family lawyers. Even a brief
glance at the American and international literature in this field demonstrates
that it is often produced by family law specialists.13 It remains on family
law syllabi at universities throughout the world and is frequently handled
by such practitioners.
Although the relationship between family law and commercial
surrogacy may seem so obvious as to be almost intuitive, the argument
presented here is that, on deeper analysis, family law proves ill-equipped
to regulate the commercial surrogacy industry. Yet, the more commercial
surrogacy is assumed to be a matter of family law, the less likely it is that
alternative, more productive possibilities might be explored—possibilities
better-suited to the challenges of this industry which, experience has
shown, is not going away. This article thus seeks to expose these
challenges, thereby legitimating the move away from family law as the
dominant regulatory influence of commercial surrogacy. The hope is that
this analysis will pave the way for consideration of currently unexplored
taxonomical alternatives, and what other, possibly less intuitive areas of
law, may offer for such a regulatory framework.

II. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
Commercial surrogacy has been a matter of academic interest for
decades. Since the notorious New Jersey case of Matter of Baby M in
1988,14 where surrogate Mary Beth Whitehead fled the state with the child
to whom she gave birth in an attempt to keep her, scholars have produced
extensive literature in a diverse range of fields. At least initially, some of
this literature tended strongly to favor prohibiting the commercial
surrogacy industry.15 Undeniably, there remains a strong school of thought

12. See generally Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 3 at 647, Claire Fenton-Glynn,
Surrogacy: Why the World Needs Rules for ‘Selling’ Babies, BBC (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-47826356.
13. See e.g., Martha Field, Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1155, 1155
(2014), Jens M. Scherpe & Claire Fenton-Glynn, Introduction, in EASTERN AND WESTERN
PERSPECTIVES ON SURROGACY, supra note 11, at 1.
14. See Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
15. See George W. Harris, Surrogacy, Patriarchy and Contracts, 6 PUB. AFFS. Q. 255,
266–67 (1992). See also Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 145–47 (1990).
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in favor of prohibition.16 More and more, however, the problems with
prohibition have been recognized. Intense theoretical debate remains
regarding the morality of commercial surrogacy, including questions about
commodification or where the limits of markets ought to lie.17 However,
the reality seems to be that, no matter how hard states try to prevent their
citizens from undertaking these arrangements, the desperation of the
intended parents,18 combined with the ease with which this technology can
be accessed in an increasingly globalized world, means these agreements
continue to prosper.19 If commercial surrogacy is inaccessible in their home
state, because the law bans commercial surrogacy outright, renders
prospective parents ineligible, or leaves them unable to find a surrogate by
prohibiting arrangements for profit, prospective parents will simply travel
to jurisdictions where these restrictions do not exist. Doing so often pushes
them into the shadow of the law and has proved to be problematic on
myriad counts.
For instance, commercial surrogacy tends to boom in developing
nations. Though India has now closed its borders to foreign parents, it was
at one time one of the most popular destinations for commercial
surrogacy.20 Now, it has been replaced by other unregulated alternative
countries, including Panama, Kenya, and Ukraine.21 For prospective
parents from prohibitive nations, the only option may be to engage with
surrogates in other nations, more often than not in the developing world.
These surrogates often find themselves at a socio-economic, and cultural,
disadvantage compared to the intended parents, thus they are operating in
conditions where their choices are limited and thus leaving them more
vulnerable to the imposition of undesirable or unknown terms.22 These
16. See generally RENATE KLEIN, SURROGACY: A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION 178
(Pauline Hopkins & Susan Hawthorne eds., 2017). See also MURIEL FABRE-MAGNAN, LA
GESTATION POUR AUTRUI, 97 (2013) (ebook).
17. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity? 19 PHILOS. PUB. AFFS.
71, 71 (1990), Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Things That Money Can Buy: Reproductive Justice
and the International Market for Gestational Surrogacy, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. 150, 150 (2018).
18. Intended parents are two individuals who are married and enter into an agreement
providing they will be the parents of a child born to a surrogate through assisted conception.
19. Claire Fenton-Glynn, Outsourcing Ethical Dilemmas: Regulating International
Surrogacy Arrangements, 24 MED. L. REV. 59, 60 (2016).
20. Virginie Rozée, et al., The Social Paradoxes of Commercial Surrogacy in Developing
Countries: India Before the New Law of 2018, 20 BMC WOMEN’S HEALTH 234, 235 (2020),
Amana Fontanella-Khan, India, the Rent-a-Womb Capital of the World, SLATE (Aug. 23,
2010), https://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article/india-rent-womb-capital-world.
21. Sarkar, supra note 2, at 345–346.
22. For instance, the difference between the economic profiles of gestational surrogates
in the U.S., where agencies generally reject surrogates that are financially unstable, and the
surrogates in India, where all but one reported ‘acute financial desperation.’ AMRITA PANDE,
WOMBS IN LABOR: TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY, 20 (2014). The
consequences of this acute financial desperation are evidenced by accounts of surrogates
signing contracts with a thumbprint as they could not write their name, id. at Appendix B,
with only basic provisions translated for them, id. at 69.
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disadvantages, combined with the international regulatory lacuna in which
this industry is situated, means that domestic restrictions often shift the
burden of commercial surrogacy onto women without clear rights to fall
back on, further exacerbating their risk of exploitation. In addition, the
possibility of black markets proliferating under such conditions cannot be
ignored. Although domestic arrangements do not eliminate class or racial
divides,23 unavoidably, overall higher standards of welfare and medical
regulation would at least allow for a better understanding of the risks
involved and decrease the likelihood of fundamental rights violations going
unchallenged.24
The biggest legal issues, however, arise from the private international
law challenges caused by transnational arrangements in this highly
globalized industry. Private international law challenges have given rise to
major human rights issues regarding the children themselves.25 As noted,
the lack of international regulation allows the intended parents from
restrictive states to more easily engage in “reproductive tourism,” or travel
to a jurisdiction where commercial surrogacy arrangements are unrestricted
in order to hire a surrogate.26 Challenges arise, however, when parents seek
to return home with the baby or become registered as the baby’s legal
parents in a state that would not ordinarily recognize them as such.27 This
could be, for example, because the state does not permit commercial
surrogacy or because the parents failed to comply with the restrictions the
state imposes on domestic commercial surrogacy. Once the child is born,
such states are left in an impossible position. On the one hand, recognizing
the intended parents as the parents of the child severely undermines the law
and further undercuts its coercive power, but on the other, to refuse to do
so majorly disadvantages the infant, potentially even rendering them
stateless.28
The extreme consequences of non-recognition mean states have
frequently found ad hoc means of regulating. In the U.S., this has largely

23. Heather Dillaway, Mothers for Others: A Race, Class, and Gender Analysis of
Surrogacy, 34(2) INT.’L J. SOCIO. FAM. 301, 312–319 (2008).
24. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88
IND. L. J. 1223, 1267–1269 (2013).
25. See Caitlyn Pryce, Surrogacy and Citizenship: A Conjunctive Solution to a Global
Problem, 23 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 925, 934 (2016).
26. Raywat Deonandan, Recent Trends in Reproductive Tourism and International
Surrogacy: Ethical Considerations and Challenges for Policy, 8 RISK MGMT. HEALTHCARE
POL’Y 111, 111 (2015).
27. See e.g., Mennesson v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), Labassee v. France, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2014) (both cases were heard by the European Court of Human Rights, which found
the rights of the child had been violated when France, which prohibits surrogacy in all forms,
refused to recognize the intended parents as the legal parents).
28. For instance, if the state where the child was born attributes citizenship only through
jus sanguinis and not jus soli, and neither the destination nor the receiving jurisdiction will
recognize their citizens as parents to the child.

Winter 2022

COMMERCIAL SURROGACY

9

been of the states’ own volition, and in Europe, its supranational human
rights court has demonstrated a willingness to step in and mandate ad hoc
regulation where the interests of a child would otherwise be significantly
jeopardized.29 The comparative significance of these approaches cannot be
understated.30 The incoherency of an approach whereby the law says one
thing but does another, and the consistency with which restrictions on the
commercial surrogacy industry jeopardize the fundamental rights and
needs of the child, are the primary sources of increasing calls for
regulation.31 Thus, this article proceeds assuming the undesirability of the
current legal position.

III. ADOPTING A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
As the need to regulate commercial surrogacy is increasingly accepted,
the question necessarily becomes how best to tackle this industry. The
taxonomical lens through which the law conceives of an issue and
determines how it ought to be regulated is of critical importance. This lens
affects the presumptions, standards, and arbitral mechanisms adopted in
any given case. Despite the clear importance of having a coherent paradigm
through which to structure regulation, what this paradigm should be
remains unclear in the context of commercial surrogacy. Although
exploration of what the correct paradigm should be is necessarily part of a
far wider research question, this article adopts a narrower focus to
demonstrate that the assumption that family law is the correct taxonomical
framework to regulate commercial surrogacy is fundamentally
problematic. Thus, United States jurisdictions must explore new avenues,
with more internal taxonomical comparative work to establish whether
other fields may be better suited to manage this growing market.
This article structures its analysis on Carl Schneider’s seminal paper
concerning what he describes as the five “functions” of family law.32
Although it is not the only analysis available to discuss the function of
family law, his exposition was chosen as the structural focus of this article
because it has a myriad of advantages for the purposes of this discussion.
First, and perhaps foremost, Schneider is one of few authors to write
from an American perspective, making this piece of scholarship the

29. Mennesson and Labasse, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. RICHARD BLAUWHOFF & LISETTE FROHN, International Commercial Surrogacy
Arrangements: The Interests of the Child as a Concern of Both Human Rights and Private
International Law, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 212,
213 (Christophe Paulussen et al. eds., 2016).
32. Carl Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,
497 (1992).
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obvious choice.33 Though the family law paradigm impacts regulatory
thinking far beyond this jurisdiction, this article focuses on the United
States. Beyond this, however, Schneider’s analysis is also the most useful
piece for structuring an analysis of commercial surrogacy because it does
not conform to the line of argument suggesting that family law has no
discernible overarching goal or lacks object and purpose, and as such ought
to focus instead on functionalism.34 When asking which field ought to be
taxonomically responsible for the regulation of a particular issue, a purely
functionalist answer is not enormously helpful because it overlooks the
importance of asking not only what the law does, but also how it does it.
By contrast, Schneider’s analysis does not overlook how the law
functions. This article argues that what is unique to family law are not the
functions themselves, rather, it simply offers an exploration of how these
functions operate in the particular context of family law and its unique
norms and values. Unlike analyses structured around particular values or
relationships pertinent only to family law,35 Schneider’s analysis does not
preclude the potential application of these functions to other areas of law.
One of the biggest challenges of commercial surrogacy regulation is that it
sits at an intersection of law, human rights, science, and ethics.36 As such,
commercial surrogacy regulation raises issues from myriad regulatory
spheres, with no consensus as to which discipline should be mainly
responsible for it. This article argues against the mainstream approach of
designating responsibility to family law. By adopting this “functional”
approach, however, this article also provides a framework by which other,
potentially more productive, alternatives might be considered in more
practical, homogenous terms.
Schneider’s analysis rests on five functions: (1) protectionist, (2)
facilitative, (3) channeling, (4) arbitral, and (5) expressionist.37 Taking each
function in turn, this article will show that the traditional approaches of
family law to each engender significant problems for the commercial
surrogacy industry. Accepting it is unlikely that family law will lose its
regulatory influence entirely, this article suggests that states must explore
alternatives as they continue to grapple with regulatory challenges of the
commercial surrogacy industry.

33. For example, as opposed to focusing on specific case law from England and Wales.
See generally Alison Diduck, What is Family Law For? 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 287,
287 (2011), Brenda Hale, The 8th Econ. and Soc. Rsch. Council Annual Lecture 1997:
Private Lives and Public Duties: What is Family Law For?, 20(2) J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM.
L. 125, 125 (1998).
34. See John Dewar, Family Law and its Discontents, 14 INT.’L J. L., POL’Y, & FAM. 59,
80 (2000).
35. See, e.g., JOHN EEKELAAR, FAMILY LAW AND PERSONAL LIFE 2 (2017) (describing
how power structures within families shape the traditional family values and roles).
36. PAULA GERBER & KATIE O’BYRNE, SURROGACY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2016).
37. Schneider, supra note 32, at 497.
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A. THE PROTECTIONIST FUNCTION
The first function of family law is protectionism or ensuring parties do
not come to physical or psychological harm.38 The involvement of
systemically vulnerable groups, such as women and children, arguably
heightens the importance of protectionism in commercial surrogacy. Given
the well-known and clear concerns that arise with commercial surrogacy,
particularly regarding exploitation and commodification, a legal paradigm
responsive to such a need for protectionism may be thought particularly
well-placed to manage it. The issue, however, is the paternalistic way
family law has traditionally approached markets and the potential for
exploitation and commodification they create.
1. Commercial Surrogacy
Traditionally, the family has been understood as diametrically opposed
to markets.39 Maintaining the separation between families and markets has
been considered an important mechanism of protection.40 Whilst the market
is traditionally regarded as a selfish institution, the family and home are
sanctuaries.41 Therefore, the values these two spheres espouse are assumed
to be irreconcilable. Where families conventionally promote reciprocal and
unconditional love and care, markets encourage self-interest and personal
gain.42 Consequently, there is considerable concern about the implications
of commercializing something as ostensibly private and intimate as
procreation, with family law naturally erring strongly on the side of
commercial prohibition.43
Different arguments have supported this prohibition. For Elizabeth
Anderson, the issue with non-prohibition of commercial surrogacy is the
irreconcilability of the values at stake.44 Clearly, not all things can be
measured in financial terms and there is no scale to fairly value the benefits
involved in commercial surrogacy.45 Moreover, such reductionism would
not be desirable. Communities appreciate different goods through different
modes of evaluation, and to deny this would be to deprive ourselves of
positive valuative experiences.46 There is no realistic and respectful means
of valuing human interaction nor emotion in accordance with use value.47
38. Id.
39. Viviana Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy, 25(3) L. SOC. INQ. 817, 823 (2005). See
also Frances Olsen, Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1983).
40. Zelizer, supra note 39, at 3.
41. Olsen, supra note 39, at 1498–99.
42. Id. at 1499–1500.
43. Alexander M. Capron & Margaret J. Radin, Choosing Family Law Over Contract
Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 34 (1988).
44. See Anderson, supra note 17 at 72.
45. Id. at 77.
46. Id. at 72–73.
47. Id. at 81.
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Margaret J. Radin’s “domino theory” also expresses similar concerns.48
Conceiving of human attributes as fungible, owned objects in any context,
she argues, is harmful.49 Even in transactions where money does not
exchange hands, this approach runs the risk of blinding people to the other
values at stake, ultimately leading to literal commodification.50 Radin sees
the harm of market values lying in their contagion and potential for
proliferation, risking undermining other key aspects of human interaction,
such as family and love.51
Clear rebuttals exist to such arguments. In response to Anderson, for
instance, one could make the same remarks regarding doctors or teachers.
Similarly, there is no clear evidence to support Radin’s argument. Sex
work, for example, one of the world’s oldest occupations, does not seem to
have degraded all sexual intimacy to meaninglessness. Despite this,
however, the idea of such a dichotomy between the market and the family
persists, exerting influence over family law. This is visible in the
international resistance to paid adoption,52 where there is notable reluctance
by regulators to accept the reality that there are economic incentives
involved—even in the face of clear evidence to the contrary.53 This
reluctance reflects the ideological commitment of family law to market
resistance.
As previously discussed, however, prophylactic prohibition creates
many problems when used as a strategy for regulation of commercial
surrogacy. In addition, it is not entirely clear whether problems associated
with commercial surrogacy, such as exploitation, invalid consent, or loss of
reproductive autonomy, are inherent to it or whether proper regulation,
along with comprehensive ex ante discussion, would make an ethical
approach possible.54 For family law to accept these arguments and embrace
such a highly contractual and marketed phenomenon into its regulatory
fold, however, would subvert some of its fundamental tenets. Introducing
such a degree of inconsistency seems fundamentally problematic and
makes responsivity more unlikely. This, again, strongly indicates the need
to find an alternative legal paradigm.

48. MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 99 (1996).
49. Id. at 88.
50. Id. at 101.
51. Id. at 9.
52. See Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, art. 32, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134.
53. See Michele Bratcher Goodwin, Baby Markets, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE
NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 2, 4 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010).
54. See e.g., Paul Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, If Necessary:
The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 61(3)
DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 799 (2012), Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused
Model of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 391, 393 (2012),
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2. Altruistic Surrogacy
One might think that a compromise might be to allow surrogacy
exclusively in an altruistic form. The desirability of this approach is another
live debate on which little consensus exists. 55 Although laws regarding
solely altruistic forms of surrogacy have been adopted in other countries,
for example in the U.K.,56 these laws are not common in the United States.
Altruistic surrogacy has been criticized for its perpetuation of the harmful
idea that reproductive labor is not as difficult or valuable as traditional,
productive efforts and thus is less deserving of payment or legal
recognition, which has long been the target of criticism by feminists. 57
While altruistic surrogacy is often presented to ensure surrogates are not
coerced due to a need for money, it is a fallacy to assume that other sources
of coercion do not exist in noncommercial surrogacy arrangements. For
example, surrogates are far more likely to be sourced from within the
family in the absence of commercial incentive, but familial pressure can
also be a source of coercion.
Practically speaking, the problems of legal inconsistency and
uncertainty in prohibition also cannot be ignored. For instance, in the U.K.
the law states that a parental order should be refused if the money
exchanged exceeds reasonable expenses.58 However, this has not been
followed in practice.59 The prevailing rationale is that to deny the intended
parents legal status over their child under these circumstances would be to
significantly disadvantage the child in a way states cannot reconcile with
their obligations to protect them.60 Rather than imposing this compromise
on the courts, therefore, it may be preferable to seek an entirely fresh
approach to regulation outside of family law.
B. THE FACILITATIVE FUNCTION
Schneider defines the facilitative function as the law’s responsibility to
provide legal mechanisms by which people can organize their lives as they
see fit.61 Parties should have a clear means by which they can express their
autonomy, and have such values and decisions respected and enforced by

55. See Capron & Radin, supra note 43, Ruth Walker & Liezl Van Zyle, Beyond
Altruism: A Case for Compensated Surrogate Motherhood, in BIOETHICS BEYOND
ALTRUISM: DONATING AND TRANSFORMING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 165, 165–66
(Rhonda Shaw ed., 2017).
56. Walker and Van Zyle, supra note 55.
57. MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS 5 (1988).
58. Mary Welstead, International Surrogacy: Arduous Journey to Parenthood, 9 J.
COMP. L. 298, 318 (2014).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Schneider, supra note 32, at 507.
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the state.62 Once more, however, it is not clear that family law can provide
this facilitative function in the commercial surrogacy context.
Although very few factors unify how commercial surrogacy operates
across the globe, these arrangements are facilitated almost invariably
through contracts. Even in states where these contracts are not enforceable,
it is still assumed that there will be some form of written document to which
the parties can refer.63 In many ways, this is unsurprising and should
certainly be encouraged. Contracts play a vital role in the social ordering of
almost all spheres, and in many ways, contracts are well-suited to facilitate
the smooth execution of commercial surrogacy arrangements.
1. Flexibility
The primary benefit of a contract is its flexibility. Whilst there is no
obligation to enter a contract, legally competent people can bind themselves
however they see fit within law and public policy boundaries.64
Commercial surrogacy arrangements are often highly bespoke and intricate
in nature. For instance, some include details on the diet the surrogate is
expected to follow.65 The legal regulatory mechanism therefore requires
scope for flexibility according to the specific needs of the parties, despite a
background of uniform rules. This specification of needs seems to be the
very essence of a contract.
Such flexibility can also recognize that different parties will want
different things from their commercial surrogacy relationship. The classic
contractual presumption is that if the benefits to a party do not outweigh
the risks and problems, they would not have entered the agreement. This
presumption is measured subjectively absent problems such as fraud or
duress.66 Given their different circumstances and motivations, the balance
of what surrogates are willing to sacrifice, and what they expect to receive
in return, can vary significantly. Contracts are designed to manage this
variance. Although the state may be competent to manage common
questions, such as those concerning insurance, many issues demand
negotiation by the parties themselves—for example, striking a complex
balance of what the surrogate is willing to submit to, and for how much.
Again, the legal regulatory mechanism requires scope for flexibility and
divergence according to the specific needs and desires of the parties, despite
62. Id.
63. Claire Fenton-Glynn, England and Wales from The Tolerant Approach, in EASTERN
AND WESTERN PERSPECTIVES ON SURROGACY, supra note 11, at 118.
64. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563, 568–69 (1982).
65. Top 10 Things You Might Not Realize Are in A Gestational Carrier Agreement,
SOUTHWEST SURROGACY, https://southwestsurro.com/blog/2018/1/30/top-10-things-youmight-not-realize-are-in-a-gestational-carrier-agreement (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
66. Kennedy, supra note 64, at 577.
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the application of uniform rules. Once more, this facilitative mechanism
seems to be the very essence of a contract.
2. Certainty
A secondary benefit of contracts is their certainty, something those
experiencing the turbulence of infertility may crave. The parties can have
confidence in what they have agreed on, and so long as the provisions are
lawful, they will be enforced in accordance with the parties’ wishes, rather
than be subject to the potentially prejudicial opinions of a judge. This
allows the parties to plan more effectively in advance and feel secure in
their undertaking. The possibility of contractual recourse ensures that the
surrogate will not be left unpaid or with a baby she did not want, nor will
the intended parents be empty-handed at the end of a long and costly
process. This provides peace of mind. It also reduces the risk of
opportunism, such as parties attempting to push the boundaries of demands
against the other or exploiting the reluctance to litigate when the outcome
is unknown.
It seems that any regulatory paradigm designed to regulate the
commercial surrogacy industry must be willing to recognize the legitimacy
of contracts and the critical facilitative role they play. Bitter experience has
taught that the contracting process itself is vital to the smooth execution of
commercial surrogacy arrangements.67 Comprehensive ex ante discussion
of thorny issues is the most likely way of avoiding disputes later down the
line. A pro-life surrogate, for instance, should not enter into an arrangement
with the intended parents who would prefer not to bring the pregnancy to
full term in the case of a disabled child. Although attitudes towards these
questions can be easily established through comprehensive discussion
before the contract is signed, when the parties could easily part ways, once
the surrogate is actually pregnant, these issues become intractable. Thus,
although commercial surrogacy contracts are often demonized, their
facilitative role is vital. This form of arrangement must be encouraged and
recognized by any regulatory paradigm.
3. Contracts in Family Law
However, the necessity of contracts in commercial surrogacy presents
a fundamental incompatibility with family law. Traditionally, family law
has been hostile to the notion of private ordering because of its protectionist
cornerstones.68 Institutions such as marriage and parentage, for instance,
have largely been assumed unadjustable. Though one must consent to enter
them, parties adopt terms set by the state and not themselves. To suddenly
introduce a phenomenon so intensely individualized and contractual,
67. London, supra note 54, at 421–22.
68. See Marcia Neave, Resolving the Dilemma of Difference: A Critique of the Role of
Private Ordering in Family Law, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 97, 97 (1994).
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therefore, does not seem to fit naturally with what is expected of family
law.
One could criticize this argument as an outdated presentation of family
law attitudes. Though familial institutions were long organized as a matter
of status rather than personal arrangement, their legal regulation evolved as
their social purpose did. Academics have asked whether it is legitimate for
the state to debar adult parties from amending the terms of their private
relationship,69 particularly given the historical use of institutions such as
marriage to deprive women of their property and control, rather than
protect, them.70
The late Twentieth Century did, to an extent, see a contractualization
of family law, and a shift away from a status model.71 The implications of
this contractualization continue to be discussed and developed today.72
Naturally, this shift is jurisdiction dependent, and the legal manifestations
of the debate vary, however a particularly notable example is the
recognition of private contracting between consenting adults in pre-nuptial
agreements. Although not absolute, where enforced they mark an obvious
shift away from a status-based approach to family law towards one that is
far more contractual in nature.73 Other examples of contracts in family law
exist, for instance, separation agreements or agreements to arbitrate.74
Though subject to public policy restrictions like any other contract, these
arrangements allow parties to lay out, in some considerable detail, how they
wish their property to be managed and distributed in case of separation. It
might be questioned, therefore, whether it is truly the case that family law
could not facilitate a commercial surrogacy contract with the extensive and
bespoke terms it so often entails.
The involvement of a child is, however, the major difference between
commercial surrogacy arrangements and most other forms of adult private
ordering. Allowing parties to privately contract when children are involved
often receives far more suspicion than pure property questions.75 The
obligations of parenthood are essentially inviolable. Not only is it for the
state to define how the status of mother or father is to be attributed, but
69. See Stephen Cretney, The Family and the Law—Status or Contract?, 15 CHILD &
FAM. L. Q. 403, 404 (2003).
70. Jana Singer, Legal Regulation of Marriage: From Status to Contract and Back Again,
in FAMILY IMPACT SEMINAR, STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN MARRIAGE: WHAT DO WE KNOW?
WHAT DO WE NEED TO KNOW?: PAPERS PRESENTED AT A FAMILY IMPACT SEMINAR
ROUNDTABLE MEETING IN JUNE 129, 129–30 (1997).
71. Frederik Swennen, Private Ordering in Family Law: A Global Perspective, in
CONTRACTUALIZATION OF FAMILY LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Frederik Swennen ed.,
2015).
72. Id.
73. Brian Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 249, 266
(2010).
74. Id. at 249.
75. See id. at 260.
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other than in exceptional circumstances, such as adoption, parties cannot
opt out of the consequences of parenthood. For instance, it remains the
parents’ legal responsibility to care for the child, or to pay child support.
Though issues like guardianship or parental responsibility can be adjusted,
this requires judicial, not private, ordering.76 The fear that allowing
unsupervised arrangements would jeopardize the best interests of the child,
particularly when they cannot speak for themselves, prevents the absolute
contractualization of family law. Similarly, it likely would preclude the full
recognition of these arrangements in commercial surrogacy.
Since one of the primary benefits of using contracts in the context of
commercial surrogacy is certainty, this is unlikely to be achieved if family
law is the regulatory paradigm. Although one is not yet even conceived at
the time of contracting, the entire arrangement revolves around the
possibility of a child. The idea that private ordering should be permitted to
govern this phenomenon, therefore, appears questionable at best because of
how rarely these arrangements are accepted and enforced.
Even to the extent that the relationship is recognized to be one that
primarily operates between two adults, when contracts in this area are often
subject to judicial oversight or adjustment, there is also a clear risk of
uncertainty or even prejudice, once more undermining some of a contract’s
primary facilitative benefits.77 The unsteady balance between contract and
status in family law, therefore, seems problematic for an industry clearly in
need of an approach rooted in the former. Although using contracts as a
facilitative mechanism does not require leaving the parties entirely to their
own devices, commercial surrogacy would seem better suited to a
regulatory field that recognizes the dual importance of flexibility and
protectionism and adopts different mechanisms of prevention. This further
indicates that an alternative paradigm may be better suited to ensure
commercial surrogacy’s effective management.
C. THE CHANNELING FUNCTION
Before family law is entirely dismissed for its facilitative shortcomings,
however, it should be determined how family law organizes and regulates
its institutions if it does not rely on private ordering. The fact that the
commercial surrogacy industry presently operates almost universally in
contractual form does not mean that alternatives should not be explored, in
fact, some of these alternatives may even be preferable. To examine this

76. Id. at 274.
77. Christopher Bailey, Twenty-Five Years After Baby M: How Rules Can Bring
Certainty to the World of Surrogacy Contracts, 1(1) CHILD AND FAM. L.J. 1, 20 (2013),
Anne Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers,
18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 353, 358 (2011).

18

HASTINGS JOURNAL ON GENDER AND THE LAW

Vol. 33:1

question, therefore, it is necessary to introduce what Schneider describes as
the channeling function of family law.78
The eponymous function of Schneider’s analysis is closely linked to
the concept of legal facilitation.79 According to Schneider, the channeling
function arises as the law creates and supports social institutions designed
to serve desirable ends.80 Though people are not forced to enter these social
institutions, they are often incentivized to do so.81 Conduct is prepatterned
and expected.82 Marriage and parenthood, for example, represent two such
institutions. When the state lays out such clear and formally recognized
boundaries, Schneider argues, people can organize their lives by entering
institutions with clear and uniform consequences.83 It is argued here,
however, that in the context of commercial surrogacy, channeling does not
provide a viable alternative, and thus cannot be used to support the
traditional family law paradigm. Therefore, the conclusion remains that
some form of contractual approach ought to be preferred.
1. Adoption Channel
Once the context of social institutions is considered, the reluctance to
permit private ordering becomes clear: To allow such bespoke
arrangements would be to undermine these fixed channels, and thus the
protection and certainty they provide. If these clearly defined concepts are
the framework in which family law operates, however, it is unsurprising
that the field has struggled to manage the new issue of commercial
surrogacy. Commercial surrogacy deliberately subverts traditional
definitions of parentage, making it hard to see how these arrangements
might be channeled effectively. Even channels that seem analogous, such
as adoption, on closer inspection have proved unhelpful.84
Manifestly, commercial surrogacy and adoption are similar in that they
propose alternative solutions to the question of infertility, and extensive
international provisions already exist regarding the latter.85 The Hague
Conference on Private International Law did, however, consider the
possibility of incorporating commercial surrogacy into its adoption
regulation, concluding such an approach was not feasible.86 Its rationale
rested on the purposes of adoption and commercial surrogacy, which

78. Schneider, supra note 32, at 498.
79. Id. at 507.
80. Id. at 498.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 511.
83. Id. at 509.
84. Katherine Voskoboynik, Clipping the Stork’s Wings: Commercial Surrogacy
Regulation and Its Impact on Fertility Tourism, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 336, 375–
76 (2016).
85. See e.g., RADIN supra note 48.
86. Voskoboynik, supra note 84.
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although at first glance are very similar are, in reality, very different.
Adoption, unlike surrogacy, is not a premeditated contractual
arrangement.87 As noted, the Convention also does not allow adoption for
profit.88 Additionally, there are significant demographic differences.
Surrogates are likely to have more control over their reproductive choices
when they are not constrained by the pressures of an existing pregnancy,89
acting at least in part out of altruism toward the intended parents,90 rather
than out of a belief they cannot care for the child. They are also not
necessarily related to the child.91 These reasons, among many others, make
it increasingly clear that commercial surrogacy cannot be straightforwardly
transplanted into the regulatory channel of adoption—or indeed, any preexisting disciplinary channel given the rigidity of traditional familial
definitions.
It is, of course, possible that family law could create a new channel to
respond to changed social norms and reflect the increasing use and
legitimation of this form of assisted reproduction. Indeed, it is highly likely
that this will be necessary to deal with the question of attribution of
parentage as this industry continues to grow. It is not clear, however, that
such a channeled approach is suitable to manage the relationship between
the adult parties involved.
2. Standard Form Contracts
Despite the purported rejection of contractual facilitation by family
law, it seems that a fair analogy might in fact be drawn between what
Schneider describes as the channeling function,92 and a standard form
contract. The adhesion, or standard form contract, refers to those contracts
where arrangements are mass produced and universal. They are often
established at industry level and bear clear similarities to a pre-defined
channel.93 Just as familial constructs such as marriage or adoption bring
with them fixed obligations, 94 standard form contracts also represent
arrangements with little scope for contracting out or rendering the contracts
87. Seema Mohapatra, Adopting an International Convention on Surrogacy—A Lesson
from Intercountry Adoption, 13(1) LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 25, 38–39 (2015).
88. RADIN, supra note 48.
89. Elly Teman, The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: Anthropological
Critique of the Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood, 67 SOC. SCI. MED 1104,
1108 (2008).
90. Janice Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of
Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61(1) J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 30 (2005).
91. Mohapatra, supra note 87.
92. Schneider, supra note 32, at 498.
93. They are particularly common, for instance, in the construction industry. Luke Farley,
Anatomy of a Standard Form Construction Contract, A.B.A. (July 1, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_constructio
n/2019/summer/anatomy-of-standard-form/.
94. For instance, obligations regarding asset distribution or responsibility for the
protection of the child’s welfare.
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more bespoke.95 With both, the choice is to enter the arrangement—not the
terms on which it operates.
It is true that a critical way of ensuring the smooth execution of
commercial surrogacy arrangements is to make sure that all the potential
issues are addressed ex ante. The parties need to know what they will do
regarding genetic testing, for instance, or their response in the face of an
adverse outcome. A channel akin to a standard form contract would be a
clear way of ensuring that no such risks were overlooked or missed. It is
not just important, however, that all these issues are addressed. The
solutions must also reflect their shared values and the way in which the
parties hope the process is likely to evolve. As such, terms need to be set
autonomously by the parties themselves.96
This is particularly so when the sensitivity of commercial surrogacy is
taken into consideration. Surrogacy raises questions surrounding abortion,
selective reduction, and personal decisions about how the intended parents
want their baby to be gestated and to what extent the surrogate is willing to
accommodate them. On such questions, whether these be the right to life or
simply the diet of the surrogate, there is no objectively correct answer or
widespread consensus on which the state could rely to set the channel.
Commercial surrogacy contracts involve highly specific, intensely private,
ethical, and potentially religious determinations into which the state should
not intrude, much less by establishing a channel that purports to answer
these questions for them.
Only a genuinely mutual agreement, therefore, will represent the
legitimate exercise of autonomy necessary to validate these often highly
intrusive contracts. Parties need to discuss their views between themselves
and reach solutions that reflect their subjective perspectives on such
matters, rather than have terms and solutions imposed on them. Thus, the
objectivity of a channeled or standard form arrangement is unlikely to
prove effective. Although a possible alternative could provide for states to
lay out the provisions to be included in the contract, with the precise terms
determined by the parties themselves, this is also not usually a feature of
family law, which commits itself to monolithic channels.97 Once more, the
practical mechanisms offered by family law seem to fall short of what the
commercial surrogacy industry needs. Whether described as a channel or
in standard-form contract terms, if there is a limited scope for the parties to
individualize these arrangements, family law cannot be a suitable or
effective paradigm. Thus, the conclusion that a form of contractual
regulation is most likely to be effective withstands and the shortcomings of
family law remain a concern.
95. What Are Standard Form Contracts, FAIR CONTRACTS, https://faircontracts.org/whatare-standard-form-contracts/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2021).
96. London, supra note 54, at 402.
97. Schneider, supra note 32, at 500.
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D. THE ARBITRAL FUNCTION
The arbitral function is relatively simple: It posits that the law ought to
give parties a means of resolving disputes.98 This involves the provision of
a forum in which to do so and provides clear standards for making such
decisions.99 If family law requires that commercial surrogacy contracts be
considered invalid, as this article suggests should be the case, basic contract
law dictates that courts will not have jurisdiction over them. This would
present a key issue if disagreements were to arise between the parties, as
they would not be able to enforce any terms or protections agreed therein.100
The analysis here, however, goes further. The traditional arbitral
standard of the family law court, which was turned to in Matter of Baby M,
the first legal case of a surrogate refusing to relinquish a child,101 is the
“best interests of the child” test.102 Many academics have written in favor
of ensuring this test’s centrality in any regulatory approach adopted for
commercial surrogacy.103 However, it is ill-equipped to manage the unusual
context of surrogacy. The standard protects only in name and not in
substance, thus, its abandonment does not seem concerning. Indeed, the
problems it creates seem to support that we ought to look for an alternative
regulatory field with new ways of meeting the arbitral function.
1. The Unsuitability of the “Best Interests” Test
i. Non-relinquishment Dispute
Two main forms of disagreement may arise between the parties
regarding a surrogacy arrangement. First is the rare risk that the surrogate
will feel unable to relinquish the child. Courts have dealt with this before,
as evidenced by the Matter of Baby M case, and it is certainly something
that any regulatory paradigm would have to be able to grapple with. 104
Under the family law model, resolution of this issue would require
application of the best interest test. This test is a cornerstone of international
customary and family law throughout the world, so would be the obvious
arbitral standard to make this determination.105 This does not mean,
however, that it is well-equipped for these unusual circumstances.
98. Schneider, supra note 32, at 497.
99. Id. at 505.
100. Jennifer Jackson, California Egg Toss: The High Costs of Avoiding Unenforceable
Surrogacy Contracts, 15(2) J. HIGH TECH. L. 230, 238 (2015).
101. See e.g., Matter of Baby M, supra note 14.
102. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY & CHILD.’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 2 (2020), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/best_interest.pdf.
103. Annika Keys Boyce, Protecting the Voiceless: Rights of the Child in Transnational
Surrogacy Arrangements, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 649, 669 (2013).
104. See e.g., Jackson supra note 100, Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (1993).
105. Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child states that “in
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
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Despite its clear sentiment, widespread use, and supposedly
determinative nature, “best interests” tests have long been subject to
criticism.106 Major apprehension arises as to how such a vague notion can
be applied to constructively make such significant decisions about a child’s
life.107 Though it might be felt that this discretion is justified if it protects
both the child and surrogate, before this claim can be made it is clearly
necessary to consider what it is that the courts are actually taking into
consideration when making this determination. Significant concerns, as
expounded below, can be expressed in this regard.
In executing their discretion, it is axiomatic that the courts must remain
within the boundaries of legitimacy. Over the years, there has been some
clarification on what factors can be legitimately considered when applying
this standard. For instance, while the psychological needs of the child, their
preferences, and the stability of a prospective home will all be taken into
consideration, social stereotypes, parental demands, or cultural traditions
should not.108 As with any judicial ruling, the personal views and prejudices
of a court should also be disregarded.
There is concern, however, that this has not always been respected in
the context of surrogacy and that U.S. judges have manipulated the
flexibility of the best interest test to incorporate their prejudices.109 Kelly
Oliver suggests that implicit in judges’ reasoning is the belief that
surrogates, who are generally of a lower socio-economic status than the
intended parents, are less capable of caring for a child.110 For example,
scholars posit that in the Matter of Baby M case, the relative financial
instability of the surrogate and their contempt for the conventionally
middle-class practice of psychotherapy, played a strong role in the
unfavorable decision against them.111 The likelihood of those less
financially advantaged being able to afford experts to support claims of
prejudice against them is also slim, once again leading to suggestions that
the system is pitted against them. If true, these prejudices should not be
camouflaged and justified through the best interests test. These criticisms
also arise with the best interests test in conventional custody cases,112
however, the risks are heightened within commercial surrogacy, where

of the child shall be a primary consideration.” United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
106. Robert Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 228 (1975).
107. Id. at 229.
108. Christina Fox, Contracting for Arbitration in Custody Disputes: Parental Autonomy
vs. State Responsibility, 12(2) CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547, 549 (2010).
109. Kelly Oliver, Marxism and Surrogacy, 4(3) ETHICS & REPROD. 95, 98 (1994).
110. Id. at 100–101.
111. See Matter of Baby M, supra note 14, at 458.
112. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children’s Rights: The
Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L. Q. 815, 821 (1999).
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there is no shared pool of assets and there commonly is an economic
imbalance between the parties.
Some scholars have also taken this analysis beyond the boundaries of
class. A judicial inclination to enforce gestational surrogacy can also be
viewed to represent racial bias.113 Should a surrogate of color change their
mind, Muriel Fabre-Magnan argues that judges are inclined to find against
them since they generally will not share the child’s ethnic profile.114 The
visual difference between races, Fabre-Magnan posits, further reduces the
likelihood that the judge will perceive the surrogate as the true parent.115
This reflects societal beliefs that still see race prejudicially, and supports
the suggestion that the best interests test is not currently being applied fairly
in all jurisdictions.
Problems with prejudicial implementation do not necessarily justify the
abandonment of the test as an arbitral standard. Rather, the focus should be
defining which factors to take into account, and whether the test can be
meaningfully applied to avoid these issues. Because surrogate born children
are a blank slate, however, the difficulties with this test seem inescapable.
Even without prejudice, there is no clear way to establish what is in their
‘best interests’.
Compared to ordinary custody proceedings, a non-relinquishment
dispute between a surrogate and the intended parents is much more likely
to arise at, or shortly after, birth. This is simply a product of the nature of
these arrangements. Though of course a surrogate could experience doubt
or regret about her decision at any point in life, they are most likely to pose
a challenge to the intended parents’ custody at the moment they are
confronted with relinquishment of the child and its realities.
If properly applied, the best interest test can be effective for older
children, who already have clear routines and established relationships.
They can express their opinion if they are old enough, and even where they
are not, a guardian ad litem or equivalent can assess them in situ and
provide expert opinion as to where they appear most settled or happy.116 By
contrast, it is almost impossible to determine where a new baby would be
best placed, no matter how expert or experienced a family law judge may
be in applying the test. This is due to a myriad of reasons. For instance, the
child’s bond with both the intended and surrogate parent(s) is likely to have
suffered disruptions as a natural byproduct of the surrogacy process. In
addition, although the surrogate is the one who gives birth to the child,

113. FABRE-MAGNAN, supra note 16, at 1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Karen Saywitz, et al., Interviewing Children in Custody Cases: Implications of
Research and Policy for Practice, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 542, 542 (2010).
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lactation therapy, which is known to facilitate emotional security, makes it
possible for the intended mother to breastfeed the infant.117
Although it is legitimate to take the child’s future potential happiness
into account, there would also be a very fine line, if one can be drawn at
all, between providing the child with resources they need to live
comfortably and succumbing to the prejudices described above. Even if the
intended parents are more affluent, and able to afford opportunities the
surrogate may not, this does not necessarily mean that the child will be
happier or more well-rounded with them. Child psychologists often
comment that whilst parents may get somewhat carried away with the
material provisions they make for their children, children need love more
than anything else.118 There is no way to know whether richer parents will
provide a better life for a child. While the surrogate’s home and
surrounding circumstances could be assessed to determine the child’s
wellbeing, unless the intended parents have already used surrogacy in the
past, there is no way of doing so for them.
ii. Disagreement Between the Parties
The second form of dispute that surrogacy contracts risk generating
concerns the very terms of the arrangement. The emotionally charged and
highly sensitive nature of the undertaking makes it highly likely that there
may be disputes or disagreements during the pregnancy. In this regard, the
traditional attitudes of family courts toward interventionism could prove
problematic. In addition, the mischaracterization of the surrogate-parent
relationship under family law could render this field ineffective for
surrogacy regulation.
Traditionally, family law discourages citizens from having recourse to
the legal system to resolve their disputes and disagreements.119 It is not
suggested here that parties to these contracts should rely on the law to
resolve every minor challenge, but it is also critical that parties are not
distanced from these rights. Using family law as the regulatory paradigm
for commercial surrogacy poses a risk of distancing surrogates from their
rights because the preservation of the family as a private sphere means the
law interferes only when absolutely necessary. Often, a more hands-off
approach is preferred, assuming that the parties are best equipped to resolve
the issues themselves. There is a reluctance to adopt such formalism into

117. Nicole Else-Quest et al., Breastfeeding, Bonding, and the Mother-Infant
Relationship, 49 MERRILL PALMER Q. 495, 512–13 (2003).
118. Robert Winston & Rebecca Chicot, The Importance of Early Bonding on the LongTerm Mental Health and Resilience of Children, 8(1) LONDON J. PRIMARY CARE 12, 13
(2016).
119. This is visible, for instance, in the cross-jurisdictional popularity of mandatory
mediation within family law. Noel Semple, Mandatory Family Mediation and the Settlement
Mission: A Feminist Critique, 24 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 210–211 (2012).
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the family relationship until it has broken down beyond repair.120 If there is
a chance that the vestigial bonds between the parties can resolve the issue,
rather than the courts, family law prefers such a mechanism for dispute
resolution.121
Of course, the law should not become a substitute for love and trust
within familial relationships. This would be a loss to society and traditional
familial institutions such as marriage. To use a field rooted in this premise
to regulate commercial surrogacy, however, is to misconceive the nature of
the surrogacy relationship. Particularly in its commercial form, surrogates
and the intended parents are often strangers prior to the commencement of
the process. They are introduced precisely to start a surrogacy journey
together. Though some form close bonds with their the intended parents,
and indeed may feel akin to a family, there is no formal relationship
between them. There is no customary expectation of love and loyalty as
between family members. Though this might be encouraged by the
surrogacy agency or brokers, it is not supported by strong social norms or
practice.
In reality, surrogates are more like an adjunct to a pre-existing family
unit rather than a fully integrated member. There is an anomalous financial
relationship between them and the surrogate; the knowledge that even if
they have become family-esque, they were brought together for a short time
by a specific, essentially instrumental, purpose. The responsibility and
acute emotional vulnerability of both sides make it difficult to fully
characterize this relationship as familial. It is hard to forget that they are
fundamentally tied to contractual demands and a rigidity of obligation that
sets the relationship apart from any genuine familial bond. It is open to
question whether it is fair to subject them to a sphere that is reluctant to
protect their rights formally on this basis or attempts to mold their
relationship into something it is not.
Kellie Carter Jackson’s narrative of her grandmother’s experience of
being a domestic worker in an affluent household illustrates these
concerns.122 Domestic work is another example of a role in which the line
between commercial employee and family member becomes blurred.
Because of this, Jackson argues that the disadvantages that her grandmother
faced were disguised.123 For example, her commitment and diligence was
assumed to be a product of quasi-maternal altruism, rather than understood
as a result of problematic working conditions.124 By conflating workers

120. Id. at 209–210.
121. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 42 (2006).
122. Kellie Carter Jackson, “She Was a Member of the Family”: Ethel Phillips, Domestic
Labor, and Employer Perceptions, 45 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 160, 160 (2017).
123. Id. at 170.
124. Id.
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with family members, they are burdened with expectations of altruism and
selflessness—with no obligation on their employer to reciprocate.125
The implicit power imbalance in the surrogate-intended parent
relationship rests on the fact that the surrogate is being paid by the intended
parents and may be rejected by them following the birth of the child. Yet,
this issue is overlooked by family law. Family law disempowers and
distances surrogates from their legal rights by assuming the relationship
between the surrogate and the intended parents extends beyond the
commercial, when it may do so with little other than a label, or not at all. It
also assumes that all surrogates desire a relationship with the intended
parents so intimate as to be potentially familial, when this is not always the
case. It therefore may be contrary to the surrogate’s interests to force
themselves to be viewed as some extended family member or to attempt to
legitimate their autonomous decisions through pre-existing but falsely
representative family structures. Though states may wish to encourage a
positive relationship between the surrogate and the intended parents, they
ought to be cautious about how far they are willing to make this a matter of
law.
Moreover, using family law as the arbitral paradigm risks placing a
surrogate in a difficult position. The traditional reluctance of courts to
interfere in these relationships is largely based on the assumption that
wherever possible, the state should not interfere in private family affairs.126
By making these arrangements unenforceable or informalized in the name
of protecting the family, however, the surrogate becomes trapped in a
vicious cycle. She is not a family member and, therefore, cannot necessarily
fall back on the presumed mutual respect and transparent discussion that
the courts assume exists in traditional families. However, by refusing to
enforce these arrangements, family law also prevents surrogates from
accessing legal means of recourse and, as such, may feel hesitant to try to
enforce their rights.
Family law’s preference for non-intervention simultaneously overlooks
the distinctive features of the surrogacy relationship that sets it apart from
ordinary family and leaves surrogates without formal remedy. If the law is
meant to protect these parties, this should not be overlooked. An arbitral
paradigm, therefore, needs to more aptly characterize the surrogacy
relationship and respond accordingly, and provide a label and institution
that more closely captures the reality of the relational dynamic.

125. Anna Olsen, Are Domestic Workers Really Just “One of the Family”?, ILO (May 26,
2015), https://news.trust.org/item/20150526085246-vd6jn/.
126. Hamilton, supra note 121.
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E. THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION
The final function of Schneider’s analysis is the expressive function.127
According to Schneider, there are two strands to this function within family
law: (1) giving citizens a voice by which they may speak, and (2) molding
citizens’ behavior to fit with social expectations and norms.128 Taking these
arguments into consideration, coupled with the idea detailed throughout
this article that family law requires the rejection of surrogacy in its
commercial form, would appear to create a worst case scenario for
protecting surrogates’ rights.
One of the main reasons why commercial surrogacy regulation is
increasingly being introduced in states around the world is because people
have demonstrated that they will not comply with prohibition. Prospective
parents clearly enter surrogacy arrangements despite the risks, and,
contrary to the assumptions of the expressive approach, experience
suggests the law will not stop them. Under this scenario, the outcome will
be the perpetuation of problematic situations where citizens are not being
heard and are also clearly not being molded in accordance with the values
of the state. Regulators seek to move away from this manifestly
unsatisfactory status quo, but family law norms appear to fetter them from
being able to do so. The challenges of this function thus bring the argument
of this article back full circle, emphasizing the need to find an alternative
regulatory paradigm to adequately manage the commercial surrogacy
industry.

IV. COMPLETE ABANDONMENT OF FAMILY LAW?
Despite the arguments presented here, it is important to accept that
family law is unlikely to be entirely abandoned. The final, and to some
extent most important, stage of these arrangements is the transfer of custody
to the intended parents. Even in states where these contracts are prima facie
enforceable, such as California, it is necessary to acquire a pre-birth order
from family court in order to do so.129 This requirement exists due to the
fact that attribution of parentage is a matter for state sovereignty and cannot
be relinquished through a private law mechanism, even with the consent of
both sides. It is difficult to imagine that the resolution of any dispute arising
at this stage would be left to any court other than family court.
As argued above, it is critical not to assume that the surrogate-intended
parent arrangement will result in a genuinely familial relationship, or that
family law is the correct paradigm to regulate the commercial surrogacy
process in its entirety. Family law can retain a vestigial role without

127. Schneider, supra note 32, at 498.
128. Id.
129. CAL. FAM. CODE §7962 (West 2013).
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exercising jurisdiction over the entire commercial surrogacy arrangement.
Similarly, the inability of other spheres of law to deal with this issue should
not deter scholars and practitioners from considering what they might have
to offer regarding regulation of other aspects of the surrogacy process.
More expansive, collaborative legal thinking is necessary to making
progress in effectively managing this industry. The goal of this article has
been to lay the groundwork for a cross-disciplinary approach.

V. CONCLUSION
Commercial surrogacy is an industry lacking consensus at almost every
level: morally, socially, and legally. The risk of a state violating the
fundamental rights of any of the parties involved must be mitigated and the
current regulatory scheme’s legal inconsistencies must be addressed.
However, this article has argued that the answer to that question rests on
finding which legal paradigm ought to regulate this industry. Traditionally,
family law has been assumed to be a primary contender for this role.
Through a functional analysis, however, this article has argued that it is
fundamentally ill-suited to regulate commercial surrogacy.
To the extent that regulatory thinking is confined to family law, legally
incoherent or unsatisfactory solutions seem inevitable. Though leaving
behind a paradigm of thought that has dominated the academic literature in
this field for so long may seem daunting, it is not only desirable, but
necessary. Other fields traditionally overlooked or side-lined in commercial
surrogacy regulation, such as labor, tort, or medical law, should be
explored. Only with creative thinking will a satisfactory and functional
solution to the challenge of regulating this field be achieved to provide
surrogates with the protection they sorely need. The functional model of
analysis adopted here provides considerable scope for this much needed
internal comparative work. This article has argued for future taxonomical
discussion to not be so constrained by family law norms and presumptions.
Instead, regulators must look to the wider legal discipline to consider
whether alternative approaches may facilitate more satisfactory solutions
for the regulation of commercial surrogacy.

